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ABSTRACT
As family businesses grow worldwide, the significant role of family shareholders on firm value becomes questionable. 
This study seeks to address this issue and provides new evidence on the non-linearity of family ownership-firm value 
relationship, based on 375 firm-year observations of 75 public listed companies in Saudi Arabia over five consecutive 
years (2007-2011). Interestingly, we provided evidence that the behavior of the Saudi families is changeable between 
expropriation and monitoring during the life of the business depending on the percentage of family ownership. We found 
sufficient evidence that the turning point occurs at the 28% family ownership. This confirmed the expropriated-monitoring 
behavior of family shareholders in their businesses. These results were robust with respect to different family definitions 
and analyses. Our findings suggested that investors should not undervalue Saudi family firms due to family ownership 
per se. At a certain degree of ownership, the benefits of Saudi family monitoring actually exceed the costs. The results 
suggested that there may be a need to encourage policy makers in Saudi Arabia to impose the full disclosure of firms’ 
ownership information, including the percentage of ownership and the identity of owners.
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ABSTRAK
Pertumbuhan perniagaan keluarga yang pesat berkembang di seluruh dunia telah memberi kesan signifikan kepada 
persoalan pemegang saham keluarga ke atas nilai firma. Oleh itu, kajian ini ingin menjawab persoalan ini dan menunjukkan 
bukti baru hubungan ketidaklinearan pemilikan keluarga dengan hubungan nilai firma berdasarkan pemerhatian ke atas 
375 firma dari 75 Syarikat Tersenarai Awam di Arab Saudi bagi lima tahun berturut-turut (2007-2011). Apa yang menarik, 
kajian ini mendapati tingkah laku keluarga Arab berubah-ubah sepanjang hayat perniagaan, bergantung kepada peratus 
pemilikan keluarga. Kajian mendapati bahawa arah perubahan bertukar pada 28% pemilikan. Ini membuktikan tingkah 
laku merampas-memantau di kalangan pemegang saham keluarga di dalam perniagaan masing-masing. Keputusan ini 
adalah mantap kerana beberapa definisi keluarga yang berbeza telah digunakan dan analisis telah dijalankan di dalam 
kajian ini. Penemuan kajian ini mencadangkan pelabur tidak perlu menilai rendah terhadap firma keluarga Arab Saudi 
dengan hanya melihat kepada pemilikan keluarga sahaja. Pada tahap pemilikan yang tertentu, manfaat pemantauan 
pemilikan keluarga Arab adalah melebihi kos. Keputusan menyarankan adalah perlu untuk menggalakkan penggubal 
polisi di Arab Saudi mengenakan pendedahan penuh ke atas firma berkaitan maklumat pemilikan termasuklah peratus 
pegangan pemilikan dan identiti pemilik.
Kata kunci: Perniagaan keluarga; pemilikan keluarga; nilai firma; ketidaklinearan; rampasan; pemantauan; Arab 
Saudi
INTRODUCTION
Jensen and Meckling (1976) offered several techniques 
of corporate control affecting the achievement of 
organizational objectives; and ownership structure is one 
of them. Ownership structure is crucial, particularly for 
firms owned by a family or by a group of families. This is 
because the firms’ objectives are interrelated with those of 
the family and owners who protect the family agenda by 
maintaining the independence of their firms. This leads 
to the irregular alignment of the owner’s interest (which 
focuses on family relationship) and the manager’s interest 
(which focuses on both profitability and competitive 
advantage), leading to the possibility of agency problems 
(Villalonga & Amit 2006). In other words, maintaining 
ownership and management in family hands may reduce 
the conflict of interest and agency costs, which invariably 
lead to the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth (Seifert, 
Gonenct & Wright 2005), or what is known as the 
convergence-of-interest or monitoring hypothesis (De 
Miguel, Pindado & De la Torre 2004; Pindado & Torre 
2006). This suggests that firm performance increases as 
family ownership grows.
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In contrast, Pindado and Torre (2006) stated that 
dominant ownership by family members may not 
always help in maximising firm value and monitoring of 
managers. However, there is a great possibility of family 
entrenchment. For example, family owners who hold a 
majority of the voting shares may have personal interests 
in the firm and use their power to take advantage of the 
resources and appropriate them to other companies owned 
by them; hence, expropriating the rights of the minority 
shareholders (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino & Buchholtz 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
Additionally, selling assets or products of a company to 
selected family members at an unfair price, offering high 
positions to incompetent relatives and paying excessive 
compensation are among good examples of minority 
expropriation (Abdullah, Shah, Iqbal & Gohar 2011). Such 
scenarios support the entrenchment behaviour of family 
controlling shareholders. 
Thus, this study aims to contribute to the existing 
literature by providing an answer to the questionable 
role of family on firm performance, and whether it 
is permanent or changeable (shown by non-linear 
relationship). This study will enrich existing knowledge 
and it is hoped that the generalisability of the findings 
can be further improved by providing new evidence that 
can confirm the changeable effect of family ownership 
between expropriation and monitoring on firms’ value. 
Data were extracted from 75 non-financial public firms 
listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (known as Tadawul) 
in Saudi Arabia for the period from 2007 to 2011 (375 
firm-year observations). The independent variable used 
in the analysis is the percentage of family ownership 
and its quadratic term. The dependent variable was firm 
performance, measured by Market-to-Book Value (MBV) 
ratio. Firm debt, firm age, firm size and industry sectors 
were included as control variables. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
NON-LINEARITY OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP-FIRM 
PERFORMANCE
Linear and non-linear relationships between family 
ownership and firm performance have been confirmed in 
the preceding literature from all over the world. Studies 
that provide evidence on the relationship between the two 
variables are many (e.g., Al-Dubai, Ku Ismail & Amran 
2014b; Amran & Ahmad 2010; Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Barontini & Caprio 2006; Ben-Amar & Andre 2006; Lee 
2006; Maury 2006; Saito 2008). For example, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) found a positive relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance in the U.S., a 
developed country. Likewise, in the context of developing 
countries, Al-Dubai et al. (2014b) and Amran and Ahmad 
(2010) found that family ownership positively affects firm 
performance of public listed companies in Saudi Arabia 
and Malaysia, respectively. Although limited research 
is available on non-linearity of the aforementioned 
relationship (e.g., Anderson & Reeb 2003; De Miguel et 
al. 2004; Kowalewski, Talavera & Stetsyuk 2010; Maury 
2006; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988), no empirical 
evidence has been found in the context of the Arabic 
region, at least, to the best of the authors’ knowledge.
Linear relationship between two variables may 
happen in two specific patterns: positive and negative. 
A positive relationship means that the two examined 
variables ‘A’ and ‘B’ move in the same direction, which 
means when variable ‘A’ increases, variable ‘B’ also 
increases; while a negative relationship moves in the 
opposite direction. Clearly, when variable ‘A’ is negatively 
associated with variable ‘B,’ an increase in variable ‘A’ 
will cause a decrease in variable ‘B,’ and vice versa. 
However, a non-linear relationship is a special case and 
takes several forms (e.g., U-shaped, inverted U-shaped & 
N-shaped). U-shaped and inverted U-shaped relationships 
are two types of what is called Quadratic-relationship with 
a single breakpoint as can be seen from Figure 1 (A and 
B). However, in order to test for the existence of U-shaped 
or inverted U-shaped relationships, the researcher is 
required to include the quadratic term (therefore, it is 
called quadratic-relationship) of the related independent 
variable into the regression model (De Miguel et al. 
2004). The relationship exists when the coefficient of 
the quadratic term is statistically significant. N-shaped 
(Cubic) relationship is another kind of non-linearity 
which is depicted graphically with maximum (FO1) 
and minimum (FO2) breakpoints (see Figure 1: C). To 
test such relationship, a cube along with a quadratic 
term must be included into the regression model and 
when the coefficient of the cubic term is significant, the 
relationship is confirmed. However, the focus of this study 
is on quadratic-relationship and our aim is to confirm its 
existence. 
When family ownership is associated with firm 
performance in a U-shaped pattern, it means that the 
families behave changeably inside the firms; which results 
in different outcomes at different points of ownership. 
Initially, an increase in family ownership facilitates the 
expropriation behaviour of families towards the minority 
shareholders; which results in destructive performance. 
However, after a critical level of family ownership, firm 
performance improves as family ownership increases 
(monitoring stage). However, in case of the inverted 
U-shaped relationship, family owners have more 
incentives to pursue their monitoring behaviour; and in 
turn, support firm performance when their shares are low. 
However, when they become more dominant, they are 
more likely to expropriate the minority shareholders to 
achieve objectives different from those of the organisation 
or maintain a high influence on the management (Anderson 
& Reeb 2003). 
Arguments in the literature imply that family 
ownership affects firm performance in either a positive 
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or a negative manner (Sciascia & Mazzola 2008). 
This argument is expected, particularly in light of the 
expropriating and monitoring behaviour of the dominant 
family block holders (Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda 2010). 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004) argued that ownership 
concentration in the hands of a family or group of families 
diminishes agency problems that may exist between 
dominant and minority shareholders. Kula (2005) added 
to this contention by stating that a high level of family 
ownership concentration assists in the prevention of 
agency problems.
According to Corbetta and Salvato (2004), agency 
problems do occur between family and minority 
shareholders although the conflict of interest is low if 
not negligible in firms that are privately held. However, 
it tends to be high in the case of publicly listed family 
firms or in firms wherein external entities have a hand 
in the ownership. However, while the expropriation of 
resources by majority shareholders has been known to 
occur in public listed companies (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester & Cannella 2007), it has also been found in small 
and medium non-listed companies (Arosa et al. 2010).
Empirical research has found a non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance 
in publicly listed family firms (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Maury 2006; Morck et al. 1988), which was later 
confirmed by Kowalewski et al. (2010), using return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as proxies of firm 
performance. Morck et al. (1988) investigated the effect 
of managerial ownership on Tobin’s Q and revealed that 
the link between the two factors is non-linear, indicating 
that an increase in Tobin’s Q occurs when management 
works in the owner’s best interests. However, a decrease 
in market value indicates the manager’s entrenchment 
behaviour. The study also revealed that Tobin’s Q increases 
with an increase in ownership of management to 5% and 
decreases as ownership increases to 25%. The rising 
trend continues when ownership is more than 25%. This 
non-linear relationship is supported by Kowalewski et 
al. (2010), but only with accounting-based performance 
indicators (i.e., ROE and ROA). Ownership concentration 
positively affects ROE when it is lesser than 40%, and 
negatively affects ROE when the concentration level is 
40% and above.
In another study, De Miguel et al. (2004) provided the 
evidence that the relationship between family ownership 
and firm value is positive when family ownership increases 
up to 35%; it decreases with an increase of ownership from 
35% to70%; and when the latter increases to over 70%, the 
relationship again turns positive. Therefore, on the basis of 
these studies, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1 There is a non-linear relationship between family 
ownership and firm value.
RESEARCH MODELS AND MEASUREMENTS
In this study, we utilised cross-sectional time-series 
analyses to test our hypothesised non-linear relationship 
between family ownership and firm value. From 75 non-
financial public firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(namely Tadawul) in Saudi Arabia over the period from 
2007 to 2011 (375 firm-year observations), we developed 
the following model:
MBV = α0 + β1famconit + β2(famconit)
2 + β3fdebtit + 
 β4fageit + β5fsizeit + β6(industry dummies)it + μi + 
 εit,
where MBV = firm performance, measured by Market-to-
Book value, α0 = the constant, famcon = ratio of family 
ownership to the total firm ownership, famcon² = the 
quadratic term of family ownership, fdebt = ratio of the 
book value of long-term debt to total assets, fage = natural 
log of the number of years since the firm’s inception, 
fsize = natural log of the book value of total assets, 
industry dummies includes eight dummies that are: PET = 
Petrochemical sector, CEM = Cement sector, RET = Retail 
sector, FOD = Agricultural and food sector, INV = Multi-
investment sector, IND = Industrial investment sector, 
BLD = Building and construction sector, EST = Real estate 
development sector, μi = unobserved firm-level random 
effect, εit = idiosyncratic error.
FIGURE 1. Non-linear relationship forms
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In measuring the MBV, the market value of a company 
is measured by the year-end closing share price multiplied 
by the number of shares (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & 
Zimmermann 2006; Yeh 2005; Yurtoglu 2000). Family 
ownership is measured as the proportion of shares (direct 
and indirect shareholding) held by the family members 
over the total number of shares issued (Anderson & 
Reeb 2003; Kowalewski et al. 2010; Sacristan-Navarro, 
Gomez-Anson & Cabeza-Garcia 2011; Wang 2006). As 
this study focuses on the non-linearity of the relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance and 
more specifically on the quadratic-relationship, a quadratic 
term of family ownership will be included into the model. 
According to Al-Dubai, Ku Ismail and Amran (2014a), 
there is no specific concern on the family ownership cut-
off that must be adopted by researchers in order to identify 
family businesses; it is merely a matter of researchers’ 
convenience. Therefore, a firm is considered as family 
firm if the family shareholders own at least 5% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares and at least one member of 
the controlling family is involved either on the board of 
directors as chairman/director or in the management as 
CEO/executive (Al-Dubai et al. 2014a, 2014b). As firm 
performance may be affected by firm characteristics 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Sacristan-Navarro et al. 2011), 
we followed the suggestion of previous studies in family 
business to control for firm debt, firm age, firm size and 
industry sectors. Firm debt is a ratio of the book value of 
long-term debt to total assets (Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Martinez, Stohr & Quiroga 2007). We measured firm 
age and firm size as the natural log of the number of 
years since the firm’s inception (Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Arosa et al. 2010; Martinez et al. 2007; Sacristan-Navarro 
et al. 2011) and the natural log of the book value of total 
assets (Wang 2006), respectively. However, to control for 
industry sectors, eight dummy variables were introduced 
to represent the following eight industrial categories 
- petrochemical, cement, retail, agriculture and food, 
multi-investment, industrial investment, building and 
construction, real estate development. Companies that 
do not fall under any of these sectors are categorised as 
others. The dummies used are one less than the number 
of categories (Arosa et al. 2010).
The descriptive statistics of all variables and 
distribution of firms according to sectors as well as family 
and non-family are shown in Table 1. It is observed that 
there are significant differences between family and non-
family firms for MBV, firm debt, firm age, and firm size. 
Family firms are significantly smaller, older and higher 
in debt financing than their non-family counterparts. With 
respect to firm value, non-family firms tend to perform 
better than family firms. 
TABLE 1. Summary statistics for the full sample
 All Firms (n = 375) Family Firms (n = 212) Non-Family Firms (n = 163)
  Freq. % Mean Median Std. Dev. Freq. % Mean Freq. % Mean t-statistics
 MBV   1.78 1.40 1.18   1.66   1.95 2.38**
 Famcon   0.13 0.07 0.18   -   - -
 Fdebt   0.14 0.08 0.15   0.15   0.12 -2.22**
 Fage   24.41 23.00 12.53   26.67   21.48 -4.05***
 Fsize   10,000 1,800 39,000   3,900   19,000 3.71***
 PET 55 14.70    29 52.73  26 47.27  
 FOD 55 14.70    31 56.36  24 43.64  
 IND 50 13.30    20 40.00  30 60.00  
 BLD 50 13.30    39 78.00  11 22.00  
 CEM 40 10.70    25 62.50  15 37.50  
 RET 25 6.70    18 72.00  7 28.00  
 INV 25 6.70    16 64.00  9 36.00  
 EST 25 6.70    9 36.00  16 64.00  
 Others 50 13.30    25 50.00  25 50.00 
  375 100.00    212 56.53  163 43.47 
Note: MBV = Market-to-Book value ratio, Famcon = Family ownership, Fdebt = Firm debt, Fage = Firm age, Fsize = Firm size is total assets expressed 
in millions of Saudi Riyals, PET = Petrochemical sector, FOD = Agricultural and food sector, IND = Industrial investment sector, BLD = Building 
and construction sector, CEM = Cement sector, RET = Retail sector, INV = Multi-investment sector, & EST = Real estate development sector. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In the model estimation, multicollinearity, autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity were examined. The Pearson 
correlation is displayed in Table 2. According to the results, 
Famcon has no significant correlation with performance 
indicator (MBV). Meanwhile, Fdebt and Fsize have small 
and medium negative correlations with MBV, respectively; 
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and Fage has a small but positive correlation. Additionally, 
it is proven that multicollinearity is not a cause of concern, 
whereby the highest observed variance inflation index 
(VIF) is 2.11, which is far below the suggested value by 
Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010). To examine our 
data for heteroscedasticity problem, the Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg test was employed. It was found that our 
models reject the null hypothesis (Chi² = 5.17, P < 0.05), 
which indicates that the residuals are heteroscedastic. 
Following Wooldridge’s (2002) procedure, a Wald test 
using (xtserial) written-command was performed in 
order to test for the existence of autocorrelation. The 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation was rejected 
(F = 12.746, P < 0.01), suggesting that autocorrelation 
exists. Therefore, Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) random-effects model was used and robust by 
controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
using panels(het) and corr(ar1) options in STATA 12.0, 
respectively.
TABLE 2. Correlations among variables
  MBV Famcon Fdebt Fage Fsize VIF 
 MBV 1.00     
 Famcon 0.00 1.00    1.11
 Fdebt -0.22 *** -0.05 1.00   2.11
 Fage 0.12** 0.03 -0.21*** 1.00  1.33
 Fsize -0.39*** -0.04 0.58*** -0.13** 1.00 1.99
Note: ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% 
level (2 tailed). MBV = Market-to-Book value ratio, Famcon = A ratio of family-owned shares 
to the total firm’s shares, Fdebt = A ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total assets, Fage 
= Natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception, Fsize = Natural log of the book 
value of total assets.
Table 3 is divided into three panels – A, B, and C, and 
each panel includes two models: one for testing a direct 
relationship between family ownership and firm value and 
the other for testing our hypothesis on the non-linearity 
of the relationship. Panels A, B and C represent different 
family firm definitions with different ownership cut-offs 
(i.e., 5%, 10% and 20%).
From our main model (Model 2) of Panel A in 
Table 3, the results show that the coefficient of family 
ownership variable (Famcon) is negative (β = -2.89), and 
its quadratic term Famcon2 is positive (β = 5.09), both 
are strongly significant at the 1% level. This suggests that 
family ownership-firm value relationship is non-linear 
U-shaped. The fact that the relationship is quadratic 
strongly supports our hypothesis on the relationship 
between family ownership and firm value. However, the 
result is contrary to the inverted U-shaped relationship 
found by Anderson and Reeb (2003), De Miguel et al. 
(2004) and Kowalewski et al. (2010) for the US, Spain 
and Polish companies, respectively. 
The U-shaped relationship indicates that family 
shareholders expropriate their minority shareholders from 
the lowest level of family ownership up to a certain degree 
of family ownership, where the conflict of interest between 
family owners and minority shareholders is low. After 
reaching a certain level of ownership, the relationship 
reverses, in which firm performance increases as family 
ownership increases. In determining the turning point of 
the curve, we followed De Miguel et al.’s (2004) method, 
whereby ownership turning point = –(β1/2 β2). Thus, family 
ownership turning point is – (-2.89/2*5.09) = 0.28. The 
result suggests that as family ownership increases from 0% 
to 28%, the Saudi firms’ value decreases. This implies that 
family shareholders are getting more expropriating when 
the ownership increases from 0% to 28%. Beyond this 
point (28%), any increment to family ownership results in 
an increase in firm value. As family ownership increases 
from 28% onwards, family members tend to display 
extensive controlling behaviour; their private advantages 
and objectives converge with that of the firm.
A possible explanation is that when family ownership 
is very small and starts to increase, they tend to focus 
on satisfying their personal objectives and enjoy greater 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, when families own about one third of the 
firm’s shareholding, they feel that their objectives have 
been satisfied, which subsequently mitigates the conflicts 
between them and their minority shareholders. To say this 
differently, any increase in family ownership in Saudi 
firms creates greater perception among family owners 
that the firm’s value is closely tied to family wealth. This 
motivates family members to improve firm value so as to 
safeguard their family’s name and reputation, which are 
of major concerns to them.
In order to check for the robustness of our results, 
we redefined family firms by adopting different family 
ownership percentages: 10% and 20% (Panels B and C 
in Table 3, respectively). As can be seen from the table, 
family ownership variable (Famcon) and its quadratic 
term (Famcon2) keep their signs and remain significant. 
These results confirmed the argument made by Al-Dubai 
et al. (2014a) that adopting different family ownership 
cut-offs in defining family firms has no effect on the 
findings of the relationship between family ownership 
and firm performance.
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We also checked for the robustness of our results 
by conducting a cross-sectional year-by-year analysis 
separately (Table 4) in order to confirm the presence of 
the U-shaped relationship. We noticed that the U-shaped 
relationship between family ownership (Famcon2) and 
firm value (MBV) is insignificant for year 2007; however, it 
is significant for the four subsequent years (2008-2011). 
TABLE 3. Results of cross-sectional time-series analyses
 Panel A: Family Panel B: Family Panel C: Family
 Ownership 5% Ownership 10% Ownership 20%
   Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
 Constant 7.46*** 7.16*** 7.46*** 7.13*** 7.40*** 7.18***
  (9.22) (9.75) (9.18) (9.35) (8.94) (8.87)
 Famcon 0.08 -2.89*** 0.10 -2.40*** 0.30 -1.10*
  (0.31) (-4.46) (0.42) (-3.84) (1.30) (-1.66)
 Famcon2  5.09***  4.43***  2.52**
   (4.53)  (4.00)  (2.12)
 Fdebt 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.29 0.13 0.16
  (0.23) (0.82) (0.24) (1.13) (0.41) (0.54)
 Fage -0.15** -0.02 -0.15** -0.04 -0.14** -0.10*
  (-2.51) (-0.32) (-2.50) (-0.74) (-2.33) (-1.68)
 Fsize -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26***
  (-7.11) (-8.07) (-7.07) (-7.73) (-6.93) (-7.01)
 Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
 N 375 375 375 375 375 375
 R² 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26
 Wald chi² 130.66 159.37 128.88 149.02 125.93 129.11
 Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Figure in the parenthesis is (z value), ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level 
(2 tailed). Famcon = A ratio of family-owned shares to the total firm’s shares, Famcon2 = the quadratic term of family ownership, Fdebt = A 
ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total assets, Fage = Natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception, Fsize = Natural log 
of the book value of total assets, Industry dummies includes eight dummies represents the nine industry sectors that are petrochemical, cement, 
retail, agriculture and food, multi-investment, industrial investment, building and construction, real estate development.
TABLE 4. Results of cross-sectional analyses
 MBV
   Variables 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011
 Constant 14.76*** 14.36*** 3.30*** 2.92** 8.18*** 7.98*** 4.72** 4.60** 8.46*** 8.09***
  (5.25) (5.04) (2.79) (2.45) (3.51) (3.52) (2.30) (2.37) (3.65)  (3.70)
 Famcon 0.66 -2.54 1.34** -1.73 0.30 -4.03** 0.09 -5.15** -0.48 -5.27***
  (1.23) (-1.03) (2.56) (-1.63) (0.53) (-2.18) (0.16) (-2.58) (-0.70) (-2.95)
 Famcon2  5.61  5.38**  7.61**  9.25***  8.54***
   (1.42)  (2.49)  (2.51)  (2.80)  (2.78)
 Fdebt -1.03 -0.32 0.63 1.18 0.23 0.98 -0.28 0.67 -0.46 0.05
  (-0.62) (-0.21) (0.73) (1.39) (0.21) (0.92) (-0.22) (0.55) (-0.39) (0.04)
 Fage 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.30* 0.28 0.47** 0.21 0.40*
  (1.17) (1.34) (0.43) (1.10) (1.10) (1.86) (1.48) (2.24) (1.07) (1.86)
 Fsize -0.61*** -0.60*** -0.13** -0.12** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.21** -0.23** -0.35*** -0.36***
  (-4.61) (-4.49) (-2.55) (-2.46) (-3.24) (-3.43) (-2.19) (-2.53) (-3.22) (-3.53)
 Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
 N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
 R² 0.42 0.43 0.37 0.43 0.36 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.44 0.50
 F 4.89 5.15 5.02 6.28 3.41 3.47 3.54 3.50 4.10 3.94
 Prob > F 0.00 0.00 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Figure in the parenthesis is (t value), ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level (2 
tailed). Famcon = A ratio of family-owned shares to the total firm’s shares, Famcon2= the quadratic term of family ownership, Fdebt= A ratio 
of the book value of long-term debt to total assets, Fage = Natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception, Fsize = Natural log of 
the book value of total assets, Industry dummies includes eight dummies represents the nine industry sectors that are petrochemical, cement, 
retail, agriculture and food, multi-investment, industrial investment, building and construction, real estate development.
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Further, we excluded non-family businesses from 
the analyses, focusing only on family businesses with 
the different percentages (5%, 10% and 20%). Table 5 
shows that the non-linear U-shaped relationship between 
family ownership and MBV is significant with the lower 
ownership percentages (i.e., 5% and 10%). However, 
with the 20% family ownership, the relationship becomes 
inverted U-shaped but not significant at any level of 
significance. 
In general, we provided sufficient evidence for the 
non-linear relationship between the aforementioned 
variables in the analyses on the expropriated-monitoring 
behaviour of Saudi families in their businesses. Further, 
it suggests that researchers need to examine such non-
linearity between family ownership and accounting 
performance in order to provide an accurate conclusion 
on family ownership’s impact.
TABLE 5. Cross-sectional time-series analyses for only family businesses
 5% Family Ownership 10% Family Ownership 20% Family Ownership
   Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
 Constant 5.805*** 6.248*** 6.533*** 5.622*** 2.534 2.532
  (4.68) (5.19) (4.94) (7.21) (1.09) (0.98)
 Famcon 0.217 -3.923*** 0.274 -2.775** 1.406** 2.107
  (0.62) (-2.83) (0.71) (-2.19) (2.13) (0.56)
 Famcon2  6.063***  4.807***  -0.981
   (2.98)  (2.61)  (-0.21)
 Fdebt 0.388 0.525 0.326 1.284*** 0.824* 0.776
  (1.19) (1.42) (0.81) (3.51) (1.75) (1.51)
 Fage -0.264*** -0.144 -0.337*** -0.121 -0.0634 -0.103
  (-2.76) (-1.39) (-2.83) (-1.33) (-0.45) (-0.55)
 Fsize -0.179*** -0.196*** -0.201*** -0.184*** -0.0762 -0.0745
  (-2.77) (-3.11) (-3.05) (-4.57) (-0.78) (-0.70)
 Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
 N 208 208 160 160 84 84
 R² 0.1999 0.2192 0.2358 0.2420 0.2354 0.2254
 Wald chi² 92.02 113.23 86.58 215.47 99.34 94.49
 Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Figure in the parenthesis is (z value), ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level 
(2 tailed). Famcon = A ratio of family-owned shares to the total firm’s shares, Famcon2 = the quadratic term of family ownership, Fdebt = A 
ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total assets, Fage = Natural log of the number of years since the firm’s inception, Fsize = Natural log 
of the book value of total assets, Industry dummies includes eight dummies represents the nine industry sectors that are petrochemical, cement, 
retail, agriculture and food, multi-investment, industrial investment, building and construction, real estate development.
CONCLUSION
Even though family ownership on firm performance has 
been extensively examined, the examination has been 
limited to the direct effect. A few studies have however 
tackled the possibility of the non-linear relationship 
between the aforementioned variables. Thus, the main 
contribution of this study is to provide new evidence 
from the context of the Arabic region on how families’ 
behaviour changes from time to time, which result in good 
and bad market performance.
From a sample of 75 non-financial public listed 
companies in Tadawul and for five consecutive years 
from 2007 until 2011 (375 firm-year observations), we 
examined the non-linear relationship between family 
ownership and firm value as measured by MBV in order 
to investigate the behaviour of Saudi families in their 
businesses. Consistent with some previous studies, 
we found that the behaviour of the Saudi families is 
changeable during the life of the business, depending on 
the level of their ownership in the firms. Clearly, families 
start to expropriate their minority shareholders initially, 
and after certain degree of ownership (28%), they have 
greater incentives to converge their private advantages and 
objectives with those of the firm, consequently increasing 
its value. We sought to make sure that our results are robust 
with respect to different family definitions and analyses. 
We found that our findings are robust and suggested that 
researchers need to be more cautious of the non-linearity 
of the relationship. All in all, our findings indicated that 
the good and bad points about having family ownership 
would depend on their level of ownership. This study 
showed that at about 28% family ownership, companies 
are at their worst point in terms of MBV. A significantly 
lower and higher family ownership percentage is likely 
to improve firm value.
In terms of the implication of this study, the results 
offered suggestions to the practitioners (e.g., leaders and 
Chap 6.indd   63 07/03/2016   09:57:32
64 Jurnal Pengurusan 44
policy makers) in Saudi Arabia, such as the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) to revise the existing corporate governance rules. 
While the existing rules require public listed companies 
to disclose management and board members’ ownership, 
the ownership percentages and identity of the remaining 
owners (family or non-family) need not be disclosed. This 
information has significant effects on investors’ decision-
making and may be used as a reference for the investors 
to select the appropriate firm for their investments. Thus, 
leaders and policy makers are highly encouraged to 
introduce new rules that mandate public listed companies 
to disclose, in their corporate governance reports, such 
information.
The limitation of our study is that we only focused 
on the quadratic relationship between family ownership 
and firm value as evidence of non-linearity. Hence, future 
studies are encouraged to examine the other types of non-
linearity, such as the cubic relationship. Another limitation 
is the adoption of different family ownership percentages 
in our robustness analyses. Future studies may consider 
adopting different family definition categories (e.g., family 
management, family control and family succession).
The results suggested that there may be a need to 
encourage policy makers in Saudi Arabia to impose the 
full disclosure of firms’ ownership information, including 
the percentage of family ownership and the identity of 
the owners.
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